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In a recent letter, Barbosa et al.[1] claim that secure
communication is possible with bright coherent pulses,
by using quantum noise to hide the data from an eaves-
dropper. We show here that the secrecy in the scheme of
Barbosa et al is unrelated to quantum noise, but rather
derives from the secret key that sender and receiver share
beforehand.
In Ref.[1] binary data is encoded upon M/2 non-
orthogonal bases, chosen using a key K ′, which is ex-
panded from a short, shared seed key K using a stream
cipher. In the example given, each bit is encoded as one
of the M/2 possible different linear polarization bases
φl = l/M , where l(= 0, · · ·,M/2 − 1) is defined by
log2(M/2) bits of K
′. For l=even, bit=0 is represented
by φl = pil/M and bit=1 by φl = pil/M + pi/2, while for
l =odd, bit= 0 is represented by φl = pil/M + pi/2 and
bit= 1 by φl = pil/M . Since the bit values of adjacent
bases are encoded with opposite parity, Eve will be un-
able to recover the data by direct measurement due to
the Shot noise. On the other hand, since Bob has access
to K ′, he can rotate the measurement basis to the ap-
propriate angle and measure the parity to determine the
bit value. A similar scheme has been suggested in Ref.
[2] using intensity modulation.
We show that the security of this scheme is very closely
related to that of the one time pad. To realize this, notice
that it is not necessary for Bob to apply the key K ′ prior
to his measurements. Bob could gain exactly the same
information (IAB) by firstly performing a measurement
of the polarization angle and then using K ′ to determine
the bit value from this measurement. It is clear from
this line of argument, that Eve can make identical mea-
surements to Bob and will obtain identical information
(IAE = IAB) to him from this measurement. Alice and
Bob will therefore be unable to expand the secret infor-
mation they share, since the rate of this expansion is
given by ∆I = IAB − IAE = 0.[3] Unlike Bob, Eve will
be unable to interpret these measurements as she is not
in possession of K ′. Clearly, the secrecy of the data re-
lies entirely upon the secrecy of the key. Quantum noise
does not play any role, since Eve (like Bob) needs only
determine the parity of each pulse and not its exact po-
larization angle.
It is well known that the one-time pad is secure from
crypto-analysis provided the key material is used only
once. The security is compromised if the key is used re-
peatedly. This requirement of fresh key material renders
the one-time pad impractical for most applications. The
scheme of Ref.[1] would be very attractive, if quantum
noise could allow an expanded key to be used securely
with the one-time pad. Unfortunately, however, this is
not the case. If Alice and Bob use an expanded key, Eve
can analyze her measurements of the polarization angles
of each pulse to determine the seed key and data. This
is readily apparent from considering the following, very
simple, eavesdropping strategy.
Eve measures the linear polarization of each pulse. If
she measures an angle 0≤ϕ<pi/2, she assigns the bit= 0,
while if she determines pi/2 ≤ ϕ < pi she assigns bit=1.
We can regard the bit sequence that Eve determines in
this way, as the encrypted bit sequence E. Because Alice
alternates the parity of the encoded bits between adja-
cent bases, 50% of the bits in the encrypted sequence E
will agree with the corresponding bit in the original data
D and 50% will differ. Thus Alice’s and Eve’s data can be
related by D
⊕
L=E, where L=0 if Alice chooses l=even
and L=1 if l=odd. To recover the original data Eve must
determine the sequence L. Notice that the simple rela-
tionship connecting the original and encrypted data is
exactly that of the one time pad and, as for the one-time
pad, key expansion will render the scheme vulnerable to
crypto-analysis.
Using this eavesdropping strategy Eve will obtain some
errors in her encrypted data sequence when the polariza-
tion angle lies very close to 0 or pi/2. We stress that this is
simply because of the very simple decoding strategy that
we have adopted for Eve. The rate of these errors will
decrease as the intensity of the Alice’s pulses increases,
illustrating that bright pulses degrade the security. In-
deed optimal uncertainty is recovered for the case that
Alice sends single photon pulses.
In summary, the secrecy of the scheme in Ref. [1] does
not rely upon quantum noise, but rather is closely related
to that of the one-time pad. Furthermore, the require-
ment to use log2(M/2) key bits for each data bit, also
renders the scheme considerably less efficient than the
one time pad, for which just one key bit is needed per
data bit. Nevertheless, it is an alternative data encryp-
tion scheme, which, though not perfectly secure and less
efficient than the one-time pad, may find applications in
optical communication technology.
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